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ABSTRACT
This paper models and tests the implications of costly enforcement of property rights on the
pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI). We posit that domestic agents have a comparative advantage
over foreign agents in overcoming some of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions.
We model these circumstances in a principal-agent framework with costly ex-post monitoring and
enforcement of an ex-ante labor contract.  Ex-post monitoring and enforcement costs are assumed to be
lower for domestic entrepreneurs than for foreign ones, but foreign producers enjoy a countervailing
productivity advantage.  Under these asymmetries, multinationals pay higher wages than domestic
producers, in line with the insight of efficiency wages and with the evidence about the ‘multinationals
wage premium.’  FDI is also more sensitive to increases in enforcement costs.
We then test this prediction for a cross section of developing countries.  We use Mauro’s (2001)
index of economic corruption as an indicator of the strength of property right enforcement within a given
country.  We compare corruption levels for a large cross section of countries in 1989 to subsequent FDI
flows from 1990 to 1999.  We find that corruption is negatively associated with the ratio of subsequent
foreign direct investment flows to both gross fixed capital formation and to private investment.  This
finding is true for both simple cross-sections and for cross-sections weighted by country size.
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The large increase in FDI in recent decades has stimulated a growing empirical and 
theoretical literature.
1  The salient empirical regularities emerging from this literature include 
the finding of a hefty “multinational wage premium” – multinationals’ wages exceed the 
wages paid by domestic producers by a significant margin, and multinationals’ productivity 
tends to be higher than that of domestic producers.
2  The purpose of this paper is to outline 
and to test a model that provides an interpretation to these findings.  Specifically, we identify 
situations where it is in multinational’s self interest to pay a wage premium relative to 
domestic producers.   
A number of previous papers have concentrated on knowledge spillovers as an 
argument for a multinational wage premium. Fosfuri, et al (2001) introduce a model where a 
multinational pays its trained workers a higher wage to induce it to resist moving to a local 
competitor.  Our analysis focuses on the role of weaknesses in the enforcement of property 
rights, as measured by the domestic level of corruption, on the pattern and behavior of 
multinationals.    Weak property rights, and corruption in particular, have been identified as a 
major obstacle to development, potentially reducing both FDI and domestic investment.
3   
Despite efforts to limit such behavior, corruption and bribery appear to be prevalent 
features of foreign direct investment activities.  For example, Hines (1995) examines the 
impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 forbidding foreign bribery by American 
firms on subsequent FDI growth in corrupt nations originating in the United States.  Hines 
finds that the law put US firms at a competitive disadvantage in those states as growth in FDI 
                                                             
1 See Markusen (2002) and Feenstra (2002, Chapter 11) for overview of multinationals, and Lipsey (2002) for a 
review of the empirical evidence. 
 
2 See Blomström (1983b), Haddad and Harrison (1993), Okamoto and Sjöholm (1999), 
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001) and the references in Lipsey (2002). 
 
3 See Markusen (2001), Wei (1997a, b), and  Smarzynska and Wei (2000) .  
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originating in the US in corrupt states was significantly lower than in non-corrupt states 
subsequent to the law’s passage. 
We conjecture that in countries where the enforcement of property rights is limited and 
costly, domestic entrepreneurs will have an advantage, i.e. that they have access to cheaper 
means of enforcing property rights.  This may be due to multitude of reasons, like better 
familiarity of the court system and the government, better knowledge of the key people that 
should be bribed and of local networks that help in resolving disputes, etc.  Thus, one expects 
domestic agents to have comparative advantage relative foreign agents in overcoming some 
of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions.  This in turn would suggest 
that FDI would be more sensitive to weakening of property rights versus domestic 
investment. Our model focuses on the implications of this presumption on employment and 
investment patterns of domestic versus foreign entrepreneurs.
4     
Specifically, we model such circumstances in a principle agent framework with 
costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an ex-ante contract with domestic labor.  
The home advantage is manifested in the assumption that the ex-post monitoring and 
enforcement cost of the labor contract is lower for domestic entrepreneurs than for 
foreign ones.  Under these disadvantages, foreign producers require a countervailing 
productivity advantage to compete.  Given circumstances where both multinationals and 
domestic producers exist side-by-side, we show that multinationals pay higher wages than 
domestic producers, in line with the insight of efficiency wages and with the evidence 
about the ‘multinationals wage premium.’  We also show that multinational investments 
are more sensitive to weakness (or more costly enforcement of) property rights.   
                                                             
4  The literature has dealt with other possible dimensions associated with home advantages and disadvantages of 
domestic versus foreign entrepreneurs.  For example,  Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1999) studied the implication of 
multinationals having access to cheaper cost credit and possibly inferior information about the quality of 
domestic projects relative to domestic entrepreneurs on the patterns of FDI.  Our approach abstracts away from 
these issues, assuming equal financial costs for both domestic and foreign agents.  This allows us to identify the 
implications of the home advantage associated with contract enforcement on the patterns of investment.  An 3 
A growing literature also exists concerning the impact of corruption on foreign direct 
investment.  Wheeler and Mody (1992) estimate a cross-country panel of manufacturing and 
electronics investment in which a principal component they label “Risk” includes such socio-
economic factors as the Business International indicators of corruption and bureaucratic red 
tape.  They find no significant impact of this component on capital expenditures by U.S. 
multinationals.  Similarly, Hines (1995) finds no measurable impact of corruption on total 
inward FDI in host nations after 1977. 
  However, later studies find robust evidence that corruption reduces the level of FDI 
entering into a country. Wei (2000) examines a panel of bilateral stocks of FDI from 12 
source countries to 45 host countries and finds a large and statistically significant negative 
impact of corruption on inward FDI.  His point estimates indicate that the increase in  
corruption from the level of Singapore’s to that of Mexico is the equivalent of a 20 
percentage point increase in the tax rate on multinationals.  Similarly, Wei (1997) finds that 
uncertainty in corruption levels also has a measurable negative impact on inward FDI.  
  While these studies establish a negative relationship between corruption and FDI, 
their results do not imply that FDI flows are more sensitive to host country corruption levels 
than domestic investment.  The possibility that corruption is especially harmful to FDI, i.e. 
relative to its adverse impact on domestic investment, is important in terms of the general 
consensus that FDI plays an important role in transferring technology to developing 
countries.
5 
  Below, we directly examine the impact of corruption on the share of FDI in a host 
country’s overall investment portfolio.  In particular, we estimate the impact of an index of 
domestic corruption on the ratio of average FDI flows to both gross fixed capital formation 
and private domestic investment over the following ten years.  We find that corruption is 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
implication of our assumptions is that, unlike in Razin et. al. (1999), FDI unambiguously improves the host 
county’s welfare. 4 
robustly negatively correlated with the ratio of FDI to total domestic investment.  This 
suggests that corruption discourages foreign direct investment more severely than it does 
domestic investment, as predicted by our theoretical model.  We then demonstrate that this 
result is robust to the inclusion of a number of conditioning factors, as well as treatment for 
simultaneity issues. 
  This paper is organized into five sections.  Section 2 introduces a simple principal-
agent model of foreign direct investment with imperfect property right protection. Section 3 
discusses the empirical methodology and data used in the paper.  Section 4 reviews our 
results.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  A Simple Model of FDI with Imperfect Property Right Enforcement 
  In this section, we introduce a simple model of FDI with imperfect property right 
enforcement.  We assume that there is a sector containing two firms, a multinational 
subsidiary and a domestic firm.  Both of these firms are assumed to face a principal-agent 
problem vis-à-vis their laborers, with costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an ex-
ante contract.  FDI is assumed to co-exist with domestic production, where the technological 
superiority of foreign subsidiaries and the relative superiority of domestic firms concerning 
the agency problem lead to an interior solution for the share of FDI in host-country 
investment.   
  The production functions of the domestic and foreign firms are assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas in capital, K, and labor, L. We distinguish the foreign firm with stars.  The 
production function of the domestic firm is assumed to satisfy 
  Yz A K L
α β =  (1.1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 For example, see Barrel and Pain (1997). However, see Aitken and Harrison (1999) for an opposing view. 5 
where z is the effective productivity shock, the outcome of labor’s effort and the realized 














Labor’s effort therefore contributes  χ − 1  to output.   
  Similarly, the foreign firm production function is assumed to satisfy 
 
** * * * Yz A K L
α β =  (1.3) 
where 
















  We assume that ε  and 
* ε  are independently distributed uniform on the interval 
, εε  −  . 
We start the analysis with the simplest benchmark by ignoring the possibility of 
random monitoring and random shirking.  In the absence of spending monitoring and 
verification costs, the representative entrepreneur in the domestic and foreign sector observes 
only the effective productivity shocks, z and 
* z respectively.   Verification of labor effort can 
be done only ex-post, after the realization of output.  The cost of verifying labor’s effort is 
assumed to equal proportions c and 
* c  of the labor inputs, cL  and 
** cL respectively.  Since 
the cost is likely to be highly correlated within a country, we assume that 
* cc ψ = .  
Moreover, we assume that the domestic firm enjoys a low cost of verifying and enforcing  
effort, such that  1. ψ >  However, we assume that the foreign subsidiary enjoys a 
countervailing  productivity advantage over its domestic counterpart, so that * A A ≥ .   6 
  The opportunity cost of labor’s time is assumed to equalω .
6   There are two possible 
labor types, differing in the amount of effort e needed to yield the high output [alternatively, 
two possible qualities of matches between labor and capital, differing in the effort input 














where  ab ee <  and  1. ab += 
Labor’s utility satisfies 
  [ ] UC e L ω =− +  (1.6) 
where C is labor consumption and  0 ω ≥  is the shadow price of leisure.  With perfect 
information, labor is paid the sum of  L ei) ( + ω  () , ia b = with effort, and  L ω  with no effort.  
Labor knows its type, and its effort decision is endogenous.  The entrepreneurs observe only 
the effective productivity shock [ χ ε ) 1 ( +  or  ε + 1 , depending on labor’s effort]. Ex-post, the 
entrepreneur may decide to pay the verification and enforcement cost in order to reveal 
labor’s effort.  In the absence of verification and enforcement, labor’s compensation is not 
contingent on effort.   
   The labor contract sets the compensation rule ex-ante.  It has the following 
dimensions  
- A  threshold  φ of the effective productivity shock z that will trigger the costly 
verification and enforcement.   
-  In the absence of verification, or if the verification will reveal no shirking, labor 
would be paid L wn .  If shirking is detected, labor would be paid zero.
7  
                                                             
6 The opportunity cost of labor could be alternatively interpreted as leisure or as the prevailing wage in a 
traditional sector. 
7 Maximizing the penalty associated with shirking (i.e., paying zero when shirking is detected), is optimal. 7 
We assume that the various parameters induce a separating equilibrium, where the more 
efficient type (a) would supply effort, and the less efficient type (b) would shirk.   
In rational-expectation equilibrium, labor would prefer putting effort to shirking if 
the penalty for shirking exceeds the cost of effort. Under the assumptions above, this 
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The decision problems faced by the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs are identical. 
The domestic entrepreneur sets the contract in order to maximize the expected profits V, 
where 
  [1 (1 ) ] (1 ) ( ) Vb A K L K L E l c
αβ χρ =−− −+ −  (1.11) 8 
 
where the cost of capital is equal to  ρ + 1  and  () El c represents the expected cost per worker, 
which satisfies 
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1 ) ( dz z f c dz
b
w lc E n    (1.12) 
 
The first term on the RHS of equation (1.11) represents expected output.  The second 
term is the cost of capital; the third is the expected cost of labor.  The cost of employing a 
worker, ) (lc E , takes into account that the wage payment to shirking labor will be zero when 
the worker shirks, and that employing labor is associated with the expected cost of 
monitoring and enforcement [the second term of  ) (lc E ].
8   
Henceforth we focus on the case where the entrepreneur pays labor the reservation 











Optimizing V with respect to φ , K, and L, we infer: 
 
CLAIM 1: An internal separating equilibrium (i.e., where type b would shirk, and type a 
would supply the needed effort) is characterized by 
                                                             
8 Note that the support on the second term begins at () 1 ε χ − .  For analytic simplicity, we combine the labor 
monitoring and enforcement costs together. However, in the range () () 11 z ε χ ε −≤ ≤ − , the entrepreneur 
would optimally choose only to pay the enforcement costs and not monitor, since monitoring is not needed to 
establish that a worker is of type b in that range.  Similarly, within the range () 1, z ε φ −≤ ≤  the entrepreneur 
would always need to monitor to establish labor’s type, but would only face enforcement costs when the laborer 
turned out to be of type b.  While this is clearly a simplification, it drives none of the qualitative results.  We 
return to this simplification in the conclusion.   
 9 
 
  0; 0; 0; 0
n dw dL dK d
dc dc dc dc
φ
<<< >  (1.14) 
and 
 
CLAIM 2: The capital labor ratio and the optimal investment levels depend negatively on 
the expected cost of labor,  ) (lc E.  
 
Proof: see the appendix.
 9 
  Our results follow the logic of efficiency wages.  Higher monitoring costs would 
induce lower incidence of monitoring and enforcement, leading the entrepreneur to pay 
higher wages.  The net outcome is higher wage, needed to keep the penalty associated with 
shirking high enough despite the drop in the incidence of monitoring.  A by-product of it is 
that investment and employment will drop.   
  Finally, the level of monitoring and enforcement costs will affect the relative levels of 
domestic and foreign investment, as noted in the following claim: 
 
CLAIM 3: Higher enforcement costs (maintaining constant the relative cost disadvantage of 
the foreign producer, ψ ) reduce the ratio of multinational investment to domestic investment 
at a rate that increases with the enforcement cost gap.   
 
Proof: 
                                                             







, = = = c K L K V V V φ φ . 10 
Denoting the optimal stock of capital in the domestic firm by K
~, and the probability 
of enforcing and monitoring in the domestic industry by Q, we demonstrate in the appendix 
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as predicted in Claim 3. 
The intuition behind Claim 3 is that higher enforcement costs increase the ratio of 
expected enforcement costs to total worker cost, which is  () / cQ E lc  for the domestic firm 
and  () ** / * cQ El c  for the foreign firm.
10   The decrease in the ratio of foreign to domestic 
investment resulting from an increase in enforcement costs will then be proportional to the 
difference in the monitoring and enforcement cost ratios of domestic and foreign producers.  
The observation that the enforcement cost ratio increases with the level of enforcement cost 
implies that the greater is the cost gap, the larger is the drop of the relative capital share 
induced by a given increase in the monitoring and enforcement costs, c.   
  Our model therefore predicts that multinationals characterized with higher 
productivity and higher cost of monitoring and enforcement will opt to pay higher wages.  
Moreover, the greater is the cost of domestic enforcement c, the lower will be the ratio of 
foreign direct investment to domestic investment.  In the following section, we test the latter 
empirical prediction. 
 
                                                             
10 The higher cost c induces a relatively small drop in the probability of monitoring and 
enforcement, Q, such that the net effect is increasing
] [lc E
cQ
.   11 
3.  Empirics 
3.1 Methodology 
The theoretical model above implied that foreign direct investment would constitute a 
smaller share of the overall investment package in countries that had inferior property rights 
protection.  In this section, we test this theory empirically for a cross-section of countries 
using data on government corruption. 
  We first estimate the following specification 
  12 3 & ii i i
i
FDI
Corrupt Dev Ores Metals
GFCF
αβ β β ε =+ + + + (1.17) 
where  / i FDI GCFC  represents the average ratio of inward foreign direct investment to gross 
fixed capital formation from 1990 through 1999,  i Corrupt  represents the index of corruption 
from Mauro (1995), discussed in more detail below,  i Dev  represents a zero-one dummy 
indicating a developed country,  & i Ores Metals  represents the share of exports comprised of 
ores and metals, and  i ε  represents a disturbance term that is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed normal. 
  We estimate equation (1.16) with and without the  & i Ores Metals  variable, which is 
introduced to identify countries that are intensive in activities traditionally associated with 
high levels of foreign direct investment.
11 We also estimate equation (1.16) with and without 
weighting our observations by country size, as measured by gross domestic product in 1989.  
Finally, we report our results with developed and developing countries pooled with the  i Dev  
dummy included as well as the two samples separated. 
                                                             
11 The oil industry is also commonly associated with high shares of foreign direct investment.  Using the set of 
oil-exporting countries identified in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), two of the countries in our data set, 
Gabon and Iran, can be considered oil-exporting.  We re-ran the regressions with these two countries omitted 
and obtained very similar results.  These are available upon request.  12 
  Our coefficient of interest is 1 β , the impact of the corruption index in 1989 on 
subsequent inward foreign direct investment as a share of gross fixed capital formation.  The 
model is estimated using ordinary least squares with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors below. 
  Since heterogeneity in government investment may add noise to the denominator in 
the dependent variable in our specification above, we repeat our estimation using the ratio of 
average inward foreign direct investment to private domestic investment,  / i FDI PVT , from 
1990-1999.  This specification results in a smaller sample, but provides a good check of the 
robustness of the results we report for the larger sample. 
 
3.2. Data  
Corruption data was obtained from Mauro (1995). The data are from Business 
International’s index of institutional efficiency, and reflect the reports of analysts concerning 
the functioning of the domestic bureaucracy, with a grade of 10 indicating a “smoothly 
functioning, efficient bureaucracy” while a grade of 4 indicates “constant need for 
government approvals and frequent delays.”  Note that our index is negatively related to 
domestic corruption, so that a positive coefficient on this variable is expected in the 
specification above.  
Remaining data, including foreign direct investment flows, gross fixed capital 
formation, the share of private investment in total domestic investment, and the shares of ores 
and metals in total exports, were obtained from the World Development Indicators.  
Countries were designated as “developed” on the basis of membership in the OECD in 
November 1988. 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.  Our sample includes 97 countries, 76 of 
which are designated as developing and 21 of which are designated as developed.  It can be 13 
seen that the inclusion of the  & i Ores Metals  variable reduces our sample size to 71, while 
using the  / i FDI PVT  dependent variable instead of  / i FDI GCFC  reduces the sample size to 
52 countries, only 10 of which are developed.  Consequently, we do not report results for the 
developed countries alone with this dependent variable. 
Unsurprisingly, the developing nations score poorly relative to the developed nations 
in the  i Corrupt  index, with the developing nations’ mean index at 4.67 while the developed 
nations’ index has a mean of 8.874.  Nevertheless there is a fair amount of disparity within 
both samples, with the developing nations ranging from 0 to 8.33 while the developed nations 
range from 6.67 to 10. 
One might expect that the developing nations would have a higher share of inward 
foreign direct investment.  However, the data show that that is not necessarily the case.  In 
fact, the mean ratio of foreign direct investment to gross fixed capital formation is slightly 
larger for the developed nations.  In contrast, the mean ratio of FDI to private domestic 
investment is larger for the developing nations, as we might expect.  Nevertheless, neither 
difference is statistically significant. 
The simple correlations between our  i Corrupt  index and levels of investment relative 
to gross domestic product for our developing nation sample are shown in Figure 1.  It can be 
seen that there is a modest positive raw relationship between property rights protection and 
both FDI and domestic investment as measured by gross fixed capital formation.  This 
confirms the results found in Wei (2000).
12  We plot the simple correlation between the 
i Corrupt  index and the  / i FDI GCFC   and  / i FDI PVT   ratios in Figure 2 for our developing 
country sample.  We observe a modest positive relationship between protection of property 
                                                             
12 The full sample also displayed a modest positive relationship.  However, as developed countries tend to have  
much lower corruption scores, we include a dummy to identify the developed nations in our parametric analysis 
with the full sample below. 14 
rights protection and these ratios, as predicted by our theory.  We next turn towards testing 
these hypotheses formally. 
 
4. Results 
Results with  / i FDI GCFC  as the dependent variable are shown in Table 2.  It can be 
seen that the performance of the  i Corrupt  variable is very robust.  With the sample weighted 
by country size, the variable enters positively and significantly either with or without 
controlling for the share of ores and metals exports.  The point estimate of slightly over 0.02 
implies an economically significant 2 percent increase in the ratio of FDI to gross fixed 
capital formation for each point increase in the corruption index.   
With the unweighted sample, the variable enters positively and significantly after 
controlling for ores and metals exports, but is insignificant without this control.  However, we 
focus primarily on the weighted results to avoid results dominated by small outliers.  The 
very small R-squared results we obtain in all of the unweighted regressions reported suggest 
that the weighted samples contain far less noise. 
The control variables enter as would be expected.  The  i Dev  variable is negative and 
statistically significant for the weighted samples.  The  & i Ores Metals  variable enters 
positively and significantly at least a ten percent confidence level with either the weighted or 
un-weighted specifications. 
We then break the sample up into its developed and developing nation sub-samples 
and obtain similar results.  For both sub-samples, the  i Corrupt  variable enters positively and 
significantly for both specifications with a weighted sample, and after controlling for ores and 
metal exports with the un-weighted sample.  There is a notable difference in the point 
estimates between the two sub-samples, although this difference is not statistically 
significant. 15 
Table 3 displays the results with  / i FDI PVT  as the dependent variable.  As noted 
above, the use of this variable significantly reduces our sample size.  Indeed, the data is 
available for this reduced sample for only ten of the developed nations, so we do not report 
regression results for that sub-sample with this dependent variable.
13  Nevertheless, our 
results for the  i Corrupt  variable of interest appear to be robust in the full sample.  As was the 
case for the ratio to gross fixed capital formation, the  i Corrupt  variable enters positively and 
significantly in both of the specifications with the weighted sample and with the un-weighted 
sample after controlling for the share of ores and metals exports.  The coefficient values are 
also quite similar to those we obtained in the gross fixed capital formation regressions. 
The results with the developed country sample alone are also similar.  The  i Corrupt  
variable enters significantly in the weighted specification without controlling for ores and 
metals, and is close to a 10 percent confidence level with the control included. As above, the 
i Corrupt  variable also enters significantly with its expected positive coefficient with the 
& i Ores Metals  control included. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper introduced a model of foreign direct investment with costly enforcement of 
property rights.  We demonstrated that when foreign direct investment suffered from a 
relative disadvantage in property rights protection, it economized on its physical capital 
investment and paid its laborers a higher wage premium.  This premium induced a separating 
equilibrium where the relatively productive workers refrained from shirking, while the less 
productive workers shirked.  Finally, we demonstrated that the ratio of multinational 
investment to domestic investment would be increasing in the security of property rights. 
                                                             
13 For completeness, we did run the specification with this sub-sample.  Unsurprisingly, everything was very 
insignificant, including all of the control variables. 16 
  We then tested this prediction for a cross-section of countries using data on 
corruption.  Our results demonstrated a robust negative relationship between the level of 
corruption and the ratio of FDI flows to domestic investment flows. 
  It should be noted that a number of our simplifying assumptions above do not drive 
our results.  For example, our assumption of a uniform distribution for the productivity shock 
resulted in a widening of the tails of the distribution, where monitoring is not required to 
identify the worker’s type.   Using a more standard distribution, such as a normal, the 
probability space where monitoring was required would be likely to increase, and thereby 
increase the property rights advantage of the domestic firm in a corrupt environment. 
  Another simplification noted earlier was the implicit combination of monitoring and 
enforcement activities.  While the domestic entrepreneur is likely to enjoy advantages in both 
of these activities, as specified above, one could imagine a situation where relative 
advantages in monitoring may differ by industry.  Holding enforcement costs equal, we may 
see multinational investment relatively specialized in industries in which foreign firms enjoy 
relative advantages in monitoring costs.  For example, multinationals may enjoy managerial 
advantages in some industries, which may correspond to reduced monitoring costs, but may 
suffer from the enforcement disadvantages alluded to above. 
  Finally, the wage premium result above came from the specification of property rights 
limitations concerning the enforcement of labor effort.  However, one could easily imagine a 
scenario where the employment of capital also resulted in enforcement problems. In future 
work, we will also allow for property right limitations to arise in this dimension.  17 
Appendix 
This Appendix summarizes the derivation of the claims discussed in the paper. 
1. Proof of Claims 1 and 2 
  The first order conditions corresponding to the entrepreneur’s problem are: 
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Note that around the equilibrium  
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where the last equality follows from the first order condition (A1) determining the threshold 
in order to minimize the expected cost of employing a worker.  In addition, note that  
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It is easy to confirm that  
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The comparative static of the system are determined by  
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It is easy to confirm that the second order conditions for maximization hold, and the 
determinate of the system is negative.   
Hence,  
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Applying similar methodology, we infer that part A of proposition 1 follows from (A5) and 
(A4). 
 
Applying the first order conditions (A1), and the Cobb-Douglas output specification 
(1), it follows that the optimal capital and labor levels, denoted by K
~
  and L ~ , is 
 
(A6)      
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Note that, applying the envelope theorem, 19 







































Hence, higher enforcement costs would increase the expected cost of employing labor, 
reducing thereby the optimal investment, hence  
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  Note that Claim 2 then follows directly from equation (A.6). 
 
2.  Proof of Claim 3 
By equation (A6) if follows that  


















Hence, given that 
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Note that  
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Applying (A12) to (A11) we can infer that  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
1. Developing  Nations 
 
 Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
Deviation 
#  of 
Countries 
i Corrupt   4.6684 0  8.3333  1.7595  76 
/ i FDI GFCF   0.1049 -0.0930  0.3811  0.0957  76 
/ i FDI PVT   0.1861 -0.0019  0.7056  0.1613  42 
& i Ores Metals   10.178 0.03  61.18 16.0499  50 
 
 
2. Developed  Nations 
 
 Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
Deviation 
#  of 
Countries 
i Corrupt   8.8794 6.6667  10  1.0998  21 
/ i FDI GFCF   0.1107 0.0021  0.3347  0.0900  21 
/ i FDI PVT   0.1262 0.0027  0.3833  0.1047  10 
& i Ores Metals   4.8495  0.95 16.98  4.0513 21 
 
Note:  i Corrupt  is corruption index from Mauro (2000). Note that index is decreasing in domestic corruption 
level.  / i FDI GFCF  represents average ratio of inward foreign direct investment to gross fixed capital 
formation, while  / i FDI PVT  represents ratio of inward foreign direct investment to private domestic 
investment.  i Corrupt  and  & i Ores Metals  values are for 1989.  / i FDI GFCF  and  / i FDI PVT  values 
are averages from 1990-1999.24 
TABLE 2. Impact of Corruption on FDI/GFCF.  
 
I. Full  Sample 
   Weighted Unweighted 
          
￿   -0.029  -0.052  0.071**  0.030 
   (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.029)  (0.022) 
Corruption   0.023**  0.022**  0.007  0.014** 
   (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Developed  -0.098**  -0.078**  -0.025  -0.049 
   (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.033) 
Ores and Metals      0.004**    0.001* 
    (0.002)   (0.001) 
          
# of obs    97  71  97  71 
R-squared   0.15  0.22  0.02  0.09 
 
II. Developed  Nations 
   Weighted Unweighted 
          
￿   -0.207* -0.179  -0.104  -0.110 
   (0.108)  (0.116)  (0.130)  (0.130) 
Corruption   0.032**  0.026*  0.024  0.028* 
   (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Ores and Metals      0.007    -0.005 
     (0.006)    (0.004) 
          
# of obs    21  21  21  21 
R-squared   0.16  0.23  0.09  0.14 
 
III. Developing  Nations 
   Weighted Unweighted 
          
￿   0.019  0.001  0.079**  0.035 
   (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Corruption   0.013**  0.014**  0.006  0.013** 
   (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Ores and Metals     0.002**    0.001* 
    (0.001)   (0.001) 
          
# of obs    76  50  76  50 
R-squared    0.13 0.25 0.01  0.11 
 
Note: Estimation by ordinary least squares. White’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
** indicates significance at a 5 percent confidence interval.  * indicates significance at a ten percent confidence 
level. 
 25 
TABLE 3. Impact of Corruption on FDI/PVT.  
 
I. Full  Sample 
 
   Weighted   Unweighted  
          
￿   -0.004  -0.017  0.152*  0.077** 
   (0.054)  (0.058)  (0.077)  (0.036) 
Corruption   0.028**  0.025*  0.008  0.014* 
   (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.008) 
Developed  -0.180**  -0.157*  -0.094  -0.098 
   (0.078)  (0.087)  (0.063)  (0.060) 
Ores and Metals      0.003*    0.003 
    (0.002)   (0.002) 
          
# of obs    52  43  52  43 
R-squared   0.26  0.31  0.03  0.18 
 
 
II. Developing  Nations 
 
   Weighted   Unweighted  
          
￿   0.003  -0.008 0.147*  0.066* 
   (0.056)  (0.067)  (0.078)  (0.035) 
Corruption   0.026**  0.026  0.009  0.016* 
   (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.008) 
Ores and Metals      0.002    0.003 
     (0.002)    (0.002) 
          
# of obs    42  33  42  33 
R-squared   0.18  0.20  0.01  0.21 
 
Note: Estimation by ordinary least squares. White’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
** indicates significance at a 5 percent confidence interval.  * indicates significance at a ten percent confidence 
level. 26 




Note: Developing country sample.  Corruption index based on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 representing lowest 




































Note: Developing country sample. Corruption index based on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 representing lowest 
level of corruption. Data are averages of flows from 1990-1999. GFCF represents gross fixed capital formation. 
PVT represents private investment flows.  See text for details. 
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